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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
I consider three questions arising from Cohen’s interesting paper: Is sincerity in premise 
assertion a premise virtue? Are arguers who are insincere in the assertion of one or more 
of their premises necessarily indifferent to the truth? Does their insincerity necessarily 
prevent their argumentation from producing cognitive benefits?   
 
2. THE VIRTUE OF SINCERITY 
 
Cohen says that in his paper virtue argumentation theory (VAT) “is applied to the 
requirement that good arguments have good premises.” According to his abstract, what 
Cohen concludes is that “a sincerity condition serves better than truth or assertability 
conditions.” But in his introduction, Cohen says this: “Consistent with its focus on 
arguers, what matters for VAT is that arguers be sincere.” This is not an application of 
VAT to the requirement that good arguments have good premises. Rather, it’s an 
application of the theory to the requirement, as Cohen would take it to be, that good 
arguments have good arguers: to be good, arguers must be sincere. But suppose the point 
that what matters for VAT is that arguers be sincere were an application of the theory to 
the requirement that good arguments have good premises. The requirement would entail 
that to be good, premises must be sincerely asserted. But such a requirement would be 
misguided, for if a premise is sincerely asserted, the virtue is not in the premise but in the 
arguer’s performance; it lies not in what is asserted but in how the assertion is made. If 
sincerity in premise assertion is a virtue, it is located not in premises sincerely asserted, 
but in the argumentation1 of arguers who assert their premises sincerely. I don’t think that 
Cohen means to deny this point, and I think he could accept it without damage to his 
main claims. 
 
                                                     
1 In these comments, I follow Alvin Goldman in taking argumentation to be “an act of presenting an 
argument to an audience or an interlocutor” (Goldman 1995, p. 60). 
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3. INSINCERITY AND TRUTH 
 
Cohen believes that insincere arguers “lack respect for truth”; they have an attitude of 
“indifference to the truth” and a “disregard for the truth”. I think that this isn’t necessarily 
the case. It may trouble the parent in Cohen’s Santa Claus example that he is using a false 
premise, in which case he is not indifferent to the truth. But if his use of a false premise 
troubles him, he may think that his concern on this score is outweighed by what he takes 
to be the premise’s possible or likely utility in persuading the child to accept the 
argument’s conclusion and, as a result of accepting it, do something that the parent 
believes it is in the child’s interest to do (viz., go to bed). To generalize: An arguer who 
knowingly uses a false premise need not be indifferent to its falsity, or, then, to the truth. 
She may think that the premise’s falsity counts against the propriety of her using it, but 
that this worry is overridden by a further consideration, such as the likely utility her using 
it will have in achieving an outcome to which, in the context of her argumentation, she 
attaches greater importance than she does to being truthful in that context. 
 
4. INSINCERITY, VERITISTIC VALUE, AND INTERPERSONAL JUSTIFICATION  
 
Cohen holds that insincerity in argumentation “is a compromise of one’s epistemological 
integrity because it disengages and distances one from the pursuit of knowledge—and 
indeed, from any of the possible cognitive gains that can come about through 
argumentation”. I want to examine this view by reference to Alvin Goldman.  
Goldman holds that in a case of argumentation that is monological (“a stretch of 
argumentation with a single speaker” (Goldman 1999, p. 131)) and factual (“concerned 
with belief; should a proffered conclusion be believed or not?” (Goldman 1999, p. 132)),  
 
[i]f audience members accept the speaker’s evidence, and agree that the asserted conclusion P is 
inferable from this evidence, they too will adopt a belief in P (Goldman 1999, p. 133).  
 
If P is true (as Goldman here assumes it is), and if the audience “had previously withheld 
judgment, or rejected P, their switch to belief in P constitutes an increment in the social 
level of knowledge” (Goldman 1999, p. 134). This would be a “veritistically” good 
outcome - an outcome good from the point of view of truth determination and the 
production of knowledge (understood “in the ‘weak’ sense of true belief” (Goldman 
1999, p. 5)). Goldman holds that  
 
veritistically good results are expected if the practice of argumentative discourse (in the 
endorsement mode [the mode in which the arguer endorses the argument he presents]) satisfies 
four conditions: 
  
(1) the speaker believes the asserted conclusion; 
(2) the speaker believes each of the asserted premises;  
(3) the speaker is justified in believing each of the asserted premises; 
(4) the asserted premises jointly provide strong support for the conclusion2. (Goldman,            
1999, p. 134) 
                                                     
2 In a footnote Goldman says that “a better formulation of (4) would be […]: ‘the asserted premises in 
conjunction with tacit premises justifiably believed by the speaker jointly provide strong support for the 
conclusion’” (Goldman 1999, p. 134). 
 
 
2
COMMENTARY ON DANIEL H. COHEN 
 
The satisfaction by a piece of argumentation of conditions (1) and (2) ensures (or, at any 
rate, is necessary for it to be the case) that the argumentation is in “the endorsement 
mode” (as distinct, for example, from its being discourse in which the speaker merely 
presents an argument for consideration by the audience, without endorsing it).  
Conditions (1)-(4), Goldman maintains, are “conditions to which speakers should 
conform if V-value [veritistic value] is to be promoted” (Goldman 1999, p. 135). He adds 
that he has not invented these conditions.  
 
Conversational argumentation […] is governed by certain ‘folk rules,’ including rules to the effect 
that proponent arguers should conform with conditions (1)-(4), among others (Goldman 1999, p. 
135). 
 
Our interest is in condition (2): the speaker believes each of the asserted premises. 
This condition is violated if the arguer is insincere in her assertion of one or more of the 
premises. In such a case, what might otherwise have been a gain in veritistic value (the 
determination of truth, the production of knowledge) is prevented, or so it seems 
Goldman must say, given his view that speakers should conform to all four conditions if 
veritistic value is to be promoted.  
Goldman claims that if an arguer is in the epistemic position defined by 
conditions (1)-(4), “it is (rather) likely that the asserted conclusion is true” (Goldman 
1999, p. 133). Suppose that the arguer is not in that position because he is insincere in his 
assertion of one of the argument’s premises: by asserting the premise he purports to 
believe it, but he doesn’t really believe it. Hence condition (2) is not satisfied. Is it then 
less likely that the asserted conclusion is true? The answer is no (and similarly if 
condition (1) is not satisfied—if the arguer does not believe the asserted conclusion). The 
relevant conditions are (3) and (4). If condition (3) is satisfied, then (Goldman holds) the 
premises are likely to be true; thus, if condition (4) is also satisfied, the conclusion is 
likely to be true. Condition (2) has no bearing on the likelihood of the conclusion’s being 
true (and neither does condition (1)). It might be thought, though, that if condition (3) is 
satisfied, condition (2) must be satisfied as well: if the speaker is justified in believing 
each of the asserted premises, then he does believe each of them. Note that if this were 
true, condition (2) would be redundant. But it is not true. I can be justified in believing 
something that I do not in fact believe. (On this point, see Audi 1988, pp. 1-2.) 
Condition (2) is not relevant to the likelihood of the conclusion’s being true. But 
from this it does not follow that condition (2) need not be satisfied if the speaker’s 
argumentation is to result in the audience’s coming to believe the conclusion, and thus 
produce a gain in social knowledge. Here we should recall Goldman’s remark that  
 
[i]f audience members accept the speaker’s evidence, and agree that the asserted conclusion P is 
inferable from this evidence, they too will adopt a belief in P (Goldman 1999, p. 133).  
 
There is no mention here of the speaker’s believing each of the asserted premises (or of 
his believing the asserted conclusion). Moreover, if the audience members are to accept 
the speaker’s evidence, it is not necessary that they believe that the speaker believes each 
of his asserted premises, for they might have independent evidence of the truth of those 
premises. Thus condition (2) need not be satisfied if a speaker’s argumentation is to result 
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in the audience’s coming to believe the conclusion, and thus produce a gain in social 
knowledge. 
In an earlier essay (Goldman 1995), Goldman defines what he calls a justification-
creation sense of interpersonal justification (IP-justification). IP-justification so defined 
requires that the speaker create (personal) justification in the hearer. For this to happen, 
the hearer must believe the proposition that the speaker justifies to the hearer (the 
conclusion) as a result of believing the justifying premises “and appreciating the 
premises-conclusion relation” (Goldman 1995, p. 58); such IP-justification is therefore 
“persuasion entailing”. Goldman writes: 
 
Speaker S IP-justifies proposition Y to hearer S* (in the [justification-creation and] persuasion-
entailing sense) if and only if: 
 
(i) S presents an argument A to S*, of which Y is the conclusion, 
(ii) argument A is an (epistemologically) good argument relative to S*, and 
(iii) S* comes to believe Y by inference from the premises of A and appreciation of the 
proper connection between premises and conclusion. (Goldman 1995, p. 58)    
  
An argument is an epistemologically good argument relative to person N if and only if: 
 
(i) N is justified in believing the conjunction of all the premises of the argument, 
(ii) the argument is either valid or inductively strong, and 
(iii) N is justified in believing that the premises are “properly connected” to the conclusion. 
(Goldman 1995, p. 57)  
 
This definition of the epistemological conception of a good argument, Goldman notes, is 
roughly the same as Richard Feldman’s. 
Notice that Goldman’s definition of IP-justification in the justification-creation 
and persuasion-entailing sense does not require that the speaker believe the premises of 
the argument she presents to the hearer; this means that IP-justification in these senses (as 
defined by Goldman) does not require sincerity in premise assertion. An audience to 
whom a speaker IP-justifies (in these senses) a proposition becomes persuaded of the 
proposition’s truth. If the proposition is in fact true, and if it was not previously believed 
by the audience, the result is a gain in social knowledge. Such a gain, then, can be 
achieved in argumentation in which the arguer is insincere in his assertion of one or more 
of his premises.  
We reached a similar conclusion above in discussing the second of the conditions 
to which Goldman says (in Goldman 1999) speakers should conform in their 
argumentation if veritistic value is to be promoted—the condition that they believe each 
of their asserted premises. The upshot is this: it need not be the case that, as Cohen holds, 
insincerity in argumentation “disengages and distances one from the pursuit of 
knowledge—and indeed, from any of the possible cognitive gains that can come about 
through argumentation.” 
 
Link to reply         Link to paper 
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